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‘Resigned to take the bill with its 
defects’: the Catholic Church and 
the third Home Rule bill
Daithí Ó Corráin
In its chronicle of events for 1912, The Irish Catholic Directory devoted 
just a single line to the introduction of the third Home Rule bill in the 
House of Commons.1 This contrasted sharply with lengthy entries on 
the crusade against evil literature, intemperance, the sinking of Titanic 
and clerical obituaries. Even more striking was the silence of the 
Catholic hierarchy, which, as a body, did not issue any statement. This 
reticence should not, however, be regarded as episcopal disapproval. 
The bishops shared in the general air of expectancy that nationalist 
aspirations would be fulfilled by 1914: this was the product of the two 
general elections of 1910; the Parliament Act of 1911, which limited 
the capacity of the House of Lords to veto parliamentary measures; 
and the commitment of the Liberal Party under Herbert H. Asquith 
to introduce a third Home Rule bill. But for the hierarchy the 
possibility of Irish self-government presented both potential benefits 
and lurking dangers. Their responses to the bill and the deepening 
crisis of 1913 and 1914 were conditioned by two overarching factors. 
1 The Irish Catholic Directory (ICD), 1913, p. 515.
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The first was their level of confidence in the leadership of the Irish 
Party. The second applied chiefly to the Ulster bishops: the prospect 
of exclusion from an Irish parliament imperilled their religious and 
educational interests. By the onset of the First World War, the spectre 
of partition had stretched their trust in the Irish Party and support 
for a Home Rule settlement to breaking point.
The hierarchy’s support for the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) 
was far from monolithic. There were clearly discernible divisions ap-
ropos Ireland’s political representatives at Westminster. The sceptics 
included the two episcopal big beasts – Cardinal Michael Logue, 
archbishop of Armagh and primate of All Ireland, and Archbishop 
William J. Walsh of Dublin – along with Bishop Edward O’Dwyer 
of Limerick and the ailing Archbishop John Healy of Tuam. Logue’s 
lack of enthusiasm for the Irish Party had its roots in the 1890s, when 
the party was divided into bitter Redmondite, Dillonite and Healyite 
factions. The cardinal had little confidence in Redmond and Dillon, 
even after the reunification of the party in 1900, believing them too 
secularist, and was drawn, like Walsh, to Timothy Healy’s champion-
ing of Catholic interests. The active support of Logue and the clergy 
saw Healy consistently returned in North Louth; most notably he 
narrowly defeated the official Irish Party candidate in the election in 
January 1910 by eighty-four votes. By the December 1910 election, 
however, the politically pragmatic, if reticent, Logue had jettisoned 
Healy.2 The cardinal’s condemnation of the Ancient Order of Hiber-
nians (AOH) further distanced him from the IPP. He was not their 
only critic. Bishop Abraham Brownrigg of Ossory, for example, pri-
vately viewed the AOH as a danger to the faith and public order.3 But 
2 See J. Privilege, Michael Logue and the Catholic Church in Ireland, 1879–1925 
(Manchester, 2009), pp. 81–90; F. Callanan, ‘Healy, Timothy Michael’ in J. McGuire 
and J. Quinn (eds), Dictionary of Irish Biography (Cambridge, 2009), available 
online at http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a3903 (accessed 12 
October 2012).
3 Brownrigg to William Walsh, 4 April 1912, Walsh papers, 383/5, Dublin 
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among the hierarchy Logue was by far the most publicly vocal op-
ponent. During a visit to Carrickmore in 1908, he declared the AOH 
‘a pest, a cruel tyranny and an organised system of blackguardism’.4
The position of the archbishop of Dublin was somewhat different. 
By 1905 Walsh had largely withdrawn from politics. Even as Home 
Rule reached its zenith, the paucity of letters between him and John 
Redmond is striking. In March 1912, conscious of the damaging 
impression, at such a vital juncture, that the archbishop was ‘out of 
sympathy with the methods and policy of the Irish Party’, Redmond 
urged him to send a subscription to the Home Rule fund and sought 
an interview to discuss aspects of the bill.5 He had to wait almost a 
fortnight for a brusque and dismissive reply: ‘it is now some years 
since I made up my mind to have nothing more to do with Irish poli-
tics and that nothing in the world could now induce me to change 
my mind in the matter.’6 Throughout this period the archbishop was 
afflicted by poor health and preoccupied in 1913 with Dublin’s labour 
unrest, and in 1914 with ultimately unfruitful plans to build a cathe-
dral on Ormond Quay. 
The highly conservative Archbishop Healy may have sympathised 
with William O’Brien in private, and they were certainly friendly, but 
he made no public pleadings in favour of the All-For-Ireland League. 
From about 1909 he was in poor health and an auxiliary bishop was 
appointed in 1911.7 Bishop O’Dwyer, a zealous champion of Catholic 
education, was also in the sceptics’ tent. Following his death, Bishop 
Michael Fogarty of Killaloe delivered a panegyric in September 1917, 
Diocesan Archives (DDA).
4 É. Phoenix, ‘Nationalism in Tyrone, 1880–1972’, in C. Dillon and H. A. Jefferies 
(eds), Tyrone: history & society (Dublin, 2000), pp. 770–1.
5 John Redmond to Walsh, 7 March 1912, Walsh papers, 377/1, DDA.
6 Draft Walsh to John Redmond, 20 March 1912, Walsh papers, 377/1, DDA.
7 P. Maume, ‘Healy, John’ in McGuire and Quinn, Dictionary of Irish Biography, 
http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a3895) (accessed 12 October 
2012); P. Maume, The Long Gestation: Irish nationalist life, 1891–1918  (Dublin, 
1999), p. 108.
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in which he suggested that O’Dwyer’s dissatisfaction with the party 
‘arose from impatience on his part with what he considered their 
want of manly spirit in pressing the claims of Ireland’.8 Distrustful of 
the party during the third Home Rule episode, O’Dwyer did, at least, 
curb his penchant for publicly criticising it.
A large episcopal middle ground – determined not to interfere 
in politics, supportive of the national cause and reliable subscribers 
to the parliamentary fund – separated the sceptics from the party 
loyalists. The partisans included younger prelates such as Charles 
McHugh, bishop of Derry, and the urbane Patrick O’Donnell of 
Raphoe. In an address of thanks to the priests of the diocese shortly 
after his inauguration in 1907, McHugh stated that priests did not 
cease to be Irishmen and that the laity looked on clergy as natural 
leaders and expected political leadership from them.9 He was not shy 
about offering such advice. O’Donnell, a friend of McHugh since 
their student days in Maynooth and bishop of Raphoe since 1888, 
was the member of the hierarchy closest to the Irish Party leadership. 
Augustine Birrell, chief secretary from 1907 until 1916, described 
him as ‘not in the least like either Logue or Walsh. He was frankly a 
Nationalist politician with a tinge of enthusiasm in his nature.’10 A 
trustee of the party fund, O’Donnell was also an ardent supporter of 
the AOH and its national president, Joseph Devlin, who was elect-
ed nationalist MP for West Belfast in 1906. ‘Wee Joe’ reinvigorated 
the AOH, tied it to the Home Rule cause and gave it newfound 
respectability as a benefit society, but it remained avowedly sectarian 
in outlook.11 Since 1890 the bishop of Raphoe had also corresponded 
8 M. Fogarty, The Great Bishop of Limerick: panegyric delivered by the Most Rev. 
Michael Fogarty, Bishop of Killaloe, at the month’s mind of the dead prelate, in St John’s 
Cathedral, Limerick, 18 September 1917 (Dublin, 1917), p. 16.
9 P. Donnelly, ‘Bishop Charles McHugh of Derry diocese (1856–1926)’, Seanchas 
Ard Mhacha, vol. 20, no. 2 (2005), p. 221.
10 A. Birrell, Things Past Redress (London, 1937), p. 209.
11 É. Phoenix, Northern Nationalism: nationalistic politics, partition and the Catholic 
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regularly with John Dillon.12 Denis Kelly, bishop of the tiny diocese 
of Ross and the hierarchy’s financial expert, also merits mention in 
this context, though he was not as bound to the party as McHugh 
and O’Donnell were.13
Home Rule is Rome rule
Cries that Home Rule would amount to Rome rule grew in intensity 
as Home Rule moved to the top of the political agenda. Religious 
tensions were exacerbated, particularly in Ulster, by the muscularity 
of the AOH and by two papal pronouncements: the Ne Temere 
decree, which came into effect in April 1908, and the motu proprio, 
a papal rescript, Quantavis diligentia of October 1911. They were a 
godsend to anti-Home Rule pamphleteers. In essence Ne Temere was 
a housekeeping measure, providing for the first time one uniform set 
of marriage regulations for all Catholics.14 Under the canonical form, 
for a marriage to be valid it had to take place before a priest, who was 
a witness to that marriage. The decree did not, in fact, refer to the 
upbringing of children and generated little interest until the infamous 
McCann case in 1910.15 Alexander McCann, a Catholic, married 
a Presbyterian woman in a Presbyterian church in Ballymena. The 
couple subsequently moved to the Falls Road. The marriage broke 
down and McCann left home with his two children in October 1910. 
Shortly after this he attempted to have the younger child baptised in 
minority in Northern Ireland 1890–1940 (Belfast, 1994), pp. 4–5.
12 This continued until 1921. See correspondence in John Dillon papers, MSS 
6764/1–121, Trinity College Dublin Archives (TCD).
13 The 1911 census recorded 44,011 Catholics in the eleven parishes comprising 
this diocese, ICD, 1915, p. 266.
14 On the evolution of the rules of the Catholic Church governing marriage, see 
W. Van Ommeren, ‘Ne Temere’, in New Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 10 (second ed., 
Detroit, 2003), pp. 218–9.
15 See The New legislation of the Catholic Church on Betrothals & Marriage: decree of 
the Sacred Congregation of the Council approved and confirmed by His Holiness Pope Pius 
X. Authorised translation  (Dublin, 1907), pp. 1–8.
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the nearby St Paul’s Catholic church but Mrs McCann apparently 
disrupted the ceremony. McCann then disappeared. This essentially 
private marital quarrel came to public attention under the shadow of 
Ne Temere. It was alleged that the marriage had ended when a priest 
informed the couple that their marriage was void and that they would 
need to remarry in a Catholic ceremony. This Mrs McCann refused 
to do, whereupon her husband departed with the children.16 William 
Corkey, her Presbyterian minister, prepared a letter of appeal to the 
lord lieutenant on behalf of Mrs McCann, who pleaded:
In my despair I am driven to apply to you, as the head of all authority 
in this country, for help. I am without money, and but for the charity of 
kind friends I would be starving. I want to get my children and to know 
if they are alive; and I have been told, kind sir, that if you directed your 
law officers to make inquiries they could soon get me my rights. Will you 
please do so, and help a poor heartbroken woman.
This emotive letter was published in The Northern Whig on 2 
December 1910. It was accompanied by an editorial, ‘Clerical 
kidnapping in Belfast’, which warned starkly: ‘To steal the children 
of a lawfully-married Presbyterian mother, and to turn them into 
Roman Catholics against her will – to tell her that she is a harlot and 
her children bastards – all that will come quite naturally after Home 
Rule.’ This appeared just days before the general election and was 
used as propaganda against Joe Devlin in West Belfast. The McCann 
affair was debated in the House of Commons in February 1911 
during a motion raised by the unionists. Seeking to defuse the issue, 
Devlin read statements from the priests in St Paul’s. They insisted 
16 See A. C. Hepburn, Catholic Belfast and Nationalist Ireland in the Era of Joe 
Devlin, 1871–1934 (Oxford, 2008), pp. 129–30; M. Harris, The Catholic Church 
and the Foundation of the Northern Irish State (Cork, 1993), pp. 14–5; O. Rafferty, 
Catholicism in Ulster, 1603–1983: an interpretative history  (Dublin, 1993), p. 180.
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that they had never declared the marriage invalid. The nationalist MP 
claimed the affair was ‘one of the most scandalous political dodges 
ever known’.17 Nevertheless, the McCann case proved damaging. 
The situation was not helped by Cardinal Logue’s Lenten pastoral 
in February 1911, which deemed anti-Ne Temere agitation as ‘having 
been got up avowedly for the purpose of moving the civil authorities 
to fetter the action of the church and block the execution of her 
laws’.18
In this fraught atmosphere Quantavis diligentia further heightened 
anti-Catholic animosity by forbidding Catholics, under pain of 
excommunication, to compel ecclesiastics to attend civil tribunals. In 
Dublin the unionist paper The Daily Express seized on this as evidence 
of papal aggression and menacing Catholic power, and surmised that 
it would confer immunity from prosecution on Catholic clergy.19 
Daily reports and commentary on the papal rescript featured in The 
Daily Express from 21 December until the second week of January 
1912. In a letter to the press, published on 30 December, Archbishop 
Walsh attempted to check what he later regarded as ‘the lurid 
representation of the decree … based upon a total misconception’ and 
stated that the exemption had lapsed in Ireland through long disuse.20 
He then became embroiled in a public quarrel with James Campbell, 
Unionist MP for Trinity and a prominent barrister, who asserted that 
the decree was indeed applicable in Ireland.21 In The Motu Proprio 
‘Quantavis Diligentia’ and its Critics, a 110-page pamphlet published 
17 Hepburn, Catholic Belfast, p. 131.
18 ICD, 1912, p. 484; Lenten Pastoral 1911, Logue papers, Arch/9/9/5, Cardinal 
Tomás Ó Fiaich Memorial Library and Archive (OFMLA).
19 The Daily Express, 21 December 1911.
20 Irish Independent, The Freeman’s Journal, 30 December 1911; W. J. Walsh, The 
Motu Proprio ‘Quantavis Diligentia’ and its Critics (Dublin, 1912), p. 7.
21 The Daily Express, 6 and 9 January 1912; P. Maume, ‘Campbell, James Henry 
Mussen 1st Baron Glenavy’, in McGuire and Quinn, Dictionary of Irish Biography 
(http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a1422, accessed 12 October 
2012).
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in early 1912, the archbishop refuted Campbell’s claims, derided his 
qualifications ‘as an interpreter of canonical documents’ and drew 
attention to attempts to provoke outcry in the context of Home 
Rule.22
This did little to dispel the anxieties of the main Protestant 
churches as religious and political fears proved mutually reinforcing. 
At the root of this was a lack of confidence in an Irish government 
to maintain civil and religious liberties for all. The McCann case 
became a cause célèbre and was the subject of extensive protest. The 
General Synod of the Church of Ireland denounced Ne Temere. In 
his pamphlet Rome and Marriage: an examination of the recent papal 
decree, ‘Ne Temere’, Dudley Fletcher, Church of Ireland rector of 
Coolbanagher, feared: ‘If a papal decree on marriage can break up a 
home in Ireland under British law, what fair play or toleration could 
we expect under a Roman Catholic Parliament in Dublin, with 
an executive responsible thereto?’23 The perils of mixed marriages 
prompted the General Assembly of the Presbyterian church to ap-
point a committee on Ne Temere in 1911, which drew up a state-
ment as to its nature and dangerous effects and sought to have the 
decree withdrawn.24 The decree was also the subject of inter-church 
dialogue (together with national insurance, temperance and educa-
tion) between the Church of Ireland and Presbyterian Church.25 
From 1908 intra-Protestant rapprochement was encouraged by the 
Lambeth conference, the decennial meeting of the Anglican church. 
Three years later the General Synod of the Church of Ireland ap-
pointed a committee to this end; likewise the General Assembly 
22 Walsh, Motu Proprio, pp. viii, 28.
23 D. Fletcher, Rome and Marriage: an examination of the recent papal decree, ‘Ne 
Temere’  (Dublin, 1911), p. 8. On the Church of Ireland response to Ne Temere see A. 
Scholes, The Church of Ireland and the Third Home Rule Bill (Dublin, 2010), pp. 19–22.
24 Minutes of the Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in 
Ireland, vol. 12, June 1911, pp. 97, 108; June 1912, p. 377.
25 Ibid., June 1912, p. 366.
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established a Committee on Cooperation with other Evangelical 
churches in Ireland.26 
Quantavis diligentia and Ne Temere featured prominently and 
frequently in anti-Home Rule protests. At a convention in Belfast 
on 1 February 1912, over 40,000 Presbyterians feared that ‘under 
Home Rule as foreshadowed, the parliament and executive alike are 
certain to be controlled by a majority subject to the direction of the 
authors of the Ne Temere and Motu Proprio decrees.’27 As a subsequent 
resolution made clear, Presbyterian resistance to Home Rule could 
not be stated ‘without fixing attention on the religious difficulty 
that lies at the heart of the question’.28 Notably, fears of interference 
with religious liberty, denominationalisation of education and the 
endowment of the Catholic Church were all ranked ahead of the 
potential economic dangers of Home Rule. The convention had no 
confidence in any protections provided in the Home Rule measure: 
‘No safeguards which the wit of man could devise would prevent the 
Church of Rome from using the majority always at her command to 
further her designs. The security of the Protestant minority – their 
only security – is that they continue to be governed directly by the 
Imperial Parliament.’29
The same motif featured in a memorial from 131,351 adherents 
of the Presbyterian Church read at the General Assembly in 1913. 
A motion receiving the memorial and declaring the determined 
opposition of the church to Home Rule was overwhelmingly 
supported by 921 votes to only 43 against.30 In 1914 Rev. James 
26 I. Ellis, Vision and Reality: a survey of twentieth century Irish inter-church relations 
(Belfast, 1992), pp. 3–7.
27 The Irish Times, 2 February 1912.
28 ‘Home Rule Statement prepared and issued in pursuance of a resolution of the 
Presbyterian Convention held at Belfast on 1st February 1912’, p. 7.
29 Ibid., p. 14.
30 Minutes of the Proceedings, vol. 12 ( June 1913), pp. 635–6. The best-known pro-
Home Ruler was the Rev. J. B. Armour of Ballymoney.
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Bingham, the moderator of the General Assembly, described the 
Ulster Volunteer Force as ‘a great and noble army of men… preparing 
to defend themselves and us from the dangers that threaten our 
citizenship, liberties and religion’.31 Northern members of the 
Church of Ireland exhibited similarly trenchant opposition.32 Yet in 
Dublin a meeting of southern unionists in January 1913 protested 
against the introduction of religious difference into party politics and 
disapproved of the identification of the Irish Protestant churches 
with a particular party.33
As might be expected, the Catholic bishops staunchly defended 
their position on confessional lines. They were not, however, insensitive 
to the political ramifications. Many bishops were all too aware of the 
easy political capital accruing to opponents of Home Rule, even if 
based on unionist misconceptions. Writing to Archbishop Walsh in 
early 1912, Cardinal Logue was ‘sorry Your Grace is getting so much 
trouble with the Orange newspapers. It is almost useless to trouble 
about them. They want a pretext for a political cry, and no amount of 
explanation will stop them.’34 In a revealing letter to the archbishop 
of Dublin, Bishop Brownrigg questioned the wisdom of the Holy 
See in imposing such legislation without consultation: ‘It is said that 
the legislation is only tentative but that will not be taken into account 
by our enemies who can do any amount of injury to religion in the 
meantime.’35 He believed that Walsh, with due deference to the Holy 
See, could not have adopted any other position in respect of the 
motu proprio. Archbishop Thomas Fennelly of Cashel believed that a 
statement from Rome approving Walsh’s publication (that the decree 
31 R. F. G. Holmes, ‘The General Assembly and politics’, in R. F. G. Holmes and 
R. Buick Knox (eds), The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, 1840–
1990 (Belfast, 1990), pp. 175–6.
32 See the essay by Andrew Scholes in this book.
33 Irish Independent, 25 January 1913.
34 Logue to Walsh, 7 January 1912, Walsh papers, 383/5, DDA.
35 Abraham Brownrigg to Walsh, 6 January 1912, Walsh papers, 383/5, DDA.
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did not apply in Ireland) would quell the disquiet and safeguard the 
anticipated Home Rule bill.36
Curiously little was made at the time, or has been since, of the 
successful libel action taken by six priests and Robert Browne, bishop 
of Cloyne and uncle of famous photographer and Titanic survivor 
Father Frank Browne, SJ, against the proprietors of the Scottish 
newspaper the Dundee Courier, for alleging religious intolerance in 
Queenstown. In an article on 15 August 1911, the Dundee Courier 
charged that the priests and the bishop had abused their religious 
influence over the laity in 1909 to procure the indiscriminate 
dismissal of all Protestant shop assistants in the employment of 
Catholics and to ruin the business of a Catholic shopkeeper who 
had refused to discharge a Protestant employee.37 In his address to 
the jury, Alexander Ure, KC, senior counsel for the plaintiffs and the 
lord advocate, claimed that as an example of disreputable journalism 
the case was, in his experience, without parallel and that ‘political 
intent did not entitle a man to make a shameless and infamous 
attack upon other men’s private character’.38 Cardinal Logue 
believed that Browne, in winning his action, was not only ‘defending 
his own character but the good name of the Bishops and priests of 
Ireland’.39 In an effort to demonstrate that Protestants had nothing 
to fear under Home Rule, Bishop McHugh nominated David Hogg, 
a Protestant Home Ruler, for the Derry seat at Westminster in 
preference to Sir Shane Leslie, a Catholic convert. The bishop signed 
the nomination papers along with Samuel Patton, the Presbyterian 
chaplain to Derry prison.40 Others such as Bishop Patrick Finegan 
36 Fennelly to Walsh, 6 February 1912, Walsh papers, 383/5, DDA. 
37 Irish Independent, 21 and 23 December 1911, 22 March 1912; ICD, 1912, pp. 
512–3.
38 ICD, 1912, p. 513.
39 Logue to Walsh, 12 March 1912, Walsh papers, 383/5, DDA.
40 The Irish Times, 27 January 1913; Rafferty, Catholicism in Ulster, p. 188; F. J. 
Madden and T. Bradley, ‘The diocese of Derry in the twentieth century,’ in H. A. 
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of Kilmore expressed publicly the hope that Home Rule would be 
‘a solvent for the aimless, but bitter, hatreds that for too long have 
divided Irishmen’.41
As Home Rule drew closer the political necessity to reassure 
unionists that Irish self-government was not inimical to their 
interests became acute. To this end Jeremiah MacVeagh, MP for 
South Down, published two pamphlets in 1911. Home Rule in a 
Nutshell: a pocket book for speakers and electors contained, as its subtitle 
indicated, ‘a brief exposition of the arguments for Home Rule, and 
answers to the objections raised’.42 MacVeagh treated the religious 
dimension separately in Religious Intolerance under Home Rule: some 
opinions of leading Irish Protestants. This attempted to counter the so-
called ‘religious bogey’ by inviting leading and representative Irish 
Protestants to state their views. The responses were then compiled 
and published. One of the most interesting came from the pen of 
Lord Pirrie, chairman of Harland & Wolff shipyard. Although a firm 
opponent of the first and second Home Rule bills, his attitude had 
softened greatly in the interim, and by 1911 he was a firm supporter 
of the Liberal government’s plans for Home Rule:
There is no fear that the impending inauguration of an Irish legislature 
will have, as one of its results, the religious persecution of Protestants…
On the other hand, I confess with shame that in the past the spirit of 
religious intolerance has been and is even now, although in lesser degree, 
prevalent amongst a portion of the Unionist population of Ulster. 
Jefferies and C. Devlin (eds), History of the Diocese of Derry from Earliest Times 
(Dublin, 2000), p. 245.
41 Anglo Celt, 8 November 1913 cited in D. Gallogly, The Diocese of Kilmore, 1800–
1905 (Cavan, 1999), pp. 243–4.
42 J. MacVeagh, Home Rule in a Nutshell: a pocket book for speakers and electors (Dublin 
and London, 1911). The pamphlet was a response to the many manifestations of 
unionist electoral propaganda in Britain, for example The Truth About Irish Home 
Rule (by one who knows) (Dublin & Belfast, 1911).
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Happily the evidence that this unfortunate spirit is on the wane is 
indisputable.43
Both pamphlets were attacked in a unionist counterblast, The 
Home Rule ‘Nutshell ’ Examined by an Irish Unionist, published by 
the Unionist Associations of Ireland. The recent papal decrees and 
examples of clerical interference in elections, such as that by Cardinal 
Logue in North Louth, were ventilated.44 In an effort to neutralise 
fears of insidious Rome rule, Redmond published an article on 
nationalism and religion in Reynolds’s Newspaper, listing occasions 
when the laity resisted Vatican intervention in Irish affairs.45 This 
alarmed the Catholic hierarchy. In a letter to Walsh, Logue feared 
overcompensation by the Irish Party towards its rivals in religion 
by consenting to clauses in the Home Rule bill ‘directly pointing 
to and restricting the actions of Catholics… We want no Catholic 
ascendancy; but we do not want Catholics logged and muzzled as if 
they were furious dogs.’46 The bogey of religious intolerance proved 
impossible to quash. 
Education
The sensitive area of education was the hierarchy’s long-standing and 
key vested interest. There were three principal points of concern. 
First, to ensure a Catholic ethos, Catholic control of all aspects 
of the educational infrastructure had to be maintained. This was 
jeopardised by the advance of secularist legislation. The abolition of 
school boards in England and Wales and the creation of local educa-
tion authorities based on county councils under the 1902 Education 
43 J. MacVeagh, Religious Intolerance under Home Rule: some opinions of leading Irish 
Protestants (London, 1911), p. 42.
44 The Home Rule ‘Nutshell ’ Examined by an Irish Unionist  (Dublin & Belfast, 
1912), pp. 57–62.
45 Rafferty, Catholicism in Ulster, p. 189.
46 Logue to Walsh, 24 March 1912, Logue papers, Arch/9/3/3, OFMLA.
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Act had set an unwelcome precedent. The Education bill of 1906, 
which was not carried into law, was even more alarming, with clause 
four proposing that the local authority would have absolute power as 
to the appointment of teachers.47 School ethos was of signal import 
in Ulster as a means of sustaining a community that was both Catho-
lic and nationalist or conversely Protestant and unionist. 
The second point of concern was the tendency of the government 
to attach nondenominational strings to the grant of public money. 
The third anxiety was simply the magnitude of that grant. Inad-
equate funding, especially in the expanding secondary-school sector, 
was a perennial grievance. When forwarding his subscription to the 
parliamentary fund in 1911, Bishop Joseph Hoare of Ardagh hoped 
‘the coming Home Rule Bill may satisfy our desires especially in the 
financial clauses’.48 At a prize-giving ceremony in St Columb’s col-
lege in June 1913, Bishop McHugh, the school’s former president, 
contrasted the starved condition of secondary education in Ireland 
with the generous funding received in England and Scotland. He 
claimed it would require an annual grant of £120,000 to put Irish 
schools on an equal footing. The bishop urged that the financial re-
lations between Ireland and London be settled on equitable terms 
before the passing of Home Rule, lest Irish schools remain under-
funded.49
The Home Rule bill
In 1911 and 1912 finance rather than Ulster was considered the 
greatest obstacle facing Irish Home Rule.50 The Primrose committee, 
47 Redmond to O’Donnell, enclosing a confidential memorandum regarding the 
Education bill, 1906 and the Single School Areas bill, 1912, John Redmond papers, 
MS 15217/3, National Library of Ireland (NLI).
48 The Weekly Freeman, 22 April 1911 cited in D. W. Miller, Church, State and 
Nation in Ireland, 1898–1921 (Dublin, 1973), p. 269.
49 ICD, 1914, p. 516.
50 P. Jalland, The Liberals and Ireland: the Ulster question in British politics to 1914 
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comprising experts without political associations, studied the 
financial relations between Britain and Ireland and investigated 
how sufficient revenue could be raised for Ireland to meet its needs. 
The balance between income and expenditure had deteriorated 
significantly in recent years. Between 1896 and 1911 Irish revenue 
had increased by 28 per cent, whereas government expenditure in 
Ireland had risen by 91 per cent, mainly due to land purchase and 
welfare benefits.51 Bishop Denis Kelly was the Irish expert on the 
committee and he kept Redmond abreast of developments. The 
Primrose report on the fiscal arrangements of home rule favoured full 
fiscal autonomy with the imperial exchequer assuming liability for all 
Irish pensions already granted. When the committee unanimously 
passed its report, Kelly wrote enthusiastically to Redmond that ‘six 
months’ thought and study have confirmed me in the view… that 
in the altered circumstances a bold and full measure of Home Rule 
has a better chance of success than a half-measure’.52 In the event, 
the Primrose proposals were ignored, with only token concessions to 
fiscal autonomy in the Home Rule bill. 
In the 1912 Lenten pastorals of the Irish bishops an unmistakable 
air of expectancy regarding the impending Home Rule bill jostled 
with warnings against immoral publications, excessive drinking and 
the dangers of socialism. That optimism gave way to resignation 
once the details of the bill were revealed. As feared, the financial 
provisions fell very far short of fiscal autonomy. Bishop Kelly 
would accept them, he told John Dillon, only ‘with repugnance’ 
because ‘Ireland is not mistress in her own house’.53 Imperial taxes 
would continue to be levied in Ireland and paid into the Imperial 
(Brighton, 1980), p. 44.
51 Ibid., p. 45.
52 Kelly to Redmond, 6 October 1911, Redmond papers, MS 15199/4, NLI.
53 Kelly to Dillon, 17 January 1912, Dillon papers, MS 6766/41, TCD.
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Exchequer.54 Under clause fifteen, the Irish parliament had power 
to impose independent taxes and to vary or discontinue imperial 
taxes. Such powers were, however, subject to a number of restrictive 
conditions. For example, there was no entitlement to impose new 
customs duties, and imperial customs and excise duties could only 
be varied by way of addition.55 The cost of land purchase, old-age 
pensions, national insurance and the constabulary would initially 
remain imperial services. A ‘transferred sum’ would be paid into the 
Irish exchequer until such time as Irish revenue and expenditure 
balanced for three consecutive years. The clear implication was that 
the Irish parliament would be encouraged to tighten its belt. Though 
acknowledging that the ‘hands of the Irish Party are tied’, Cardinal 
Logue was disappointed at their lack of fight. ‘I have always thought,’ 
he wrote to Walsh, ‘that the finance arrangement of Mr Gladstone’s 
1893 Bill would have left Ireland in poverty and misery. This bill is 
little if at all better.’56
With the financial facet practicably immutable, the hierarchy 
turned its attention to the religious aspect of the bill, which was 
essentially contained in clause three. Logue, O’Donnell and Kelly 
were nominated to scrutinise the measure ‘as far as it affects religious 
interests’.57 In practice this meant educational interests. For the 
most part clause three replicated the provisions regarding religion in 
Gladstone’s 1886 and 1893 Home Rule bills. The Irish parliament 
would have no power to make laws establishing or endowing any 
religion; impose any disability or confer any privilege or preference or 
advantage on account of religious belief; or impair the right of a child 
to attend a school receiving public money without attending religious 
54 Government of Ireland. A bill [as amended in committee and on report] to 
amend the provision for the government of Ireland (2 & 3 Geo. 5 c. 14).
55 Ibid., c. 15.
56 Logue to Walsh, 22 November 1912, Walsh papers, 383/5, DDA.
57 Logue to Walsh, 20 November 1912, Walsh papers, 383/5, DDA.
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instruction. The furore over Ne Temere appears to have influenced 
the insertion of a sub-clause that religious belief or ceremony 
could not be made a condition of the validity of any marriage. An 
Irish parliament would have no authority to divert the property or, 
without consent, alter the constitution of any religious body without 
adequate compensation.58 During the committee stage of the bill 
this provision was extended, under clause forty-two, to guarantee 
against appropriation of the property of Trinity College and Queen’s 
University Belfast.59 
Unsurprisingly, the potential impact on Catholic education 
dominated the bishops’ consideration of the bill in November 1912. 
As Conor Mulvagh has discussed, Logue and O’Donnell sought 
the legal counsel of James Murnaghan, barrister and professor of 
jurisprudence at University College Dublin. Tellingly, six of the eight 
questions put to him pertained to education.60 Logue feared that the 
safeguards for Protestants embodied in the bill would limit Catholic 
freedom of action as ‘so many fetters riveted to our limbs’.61 The 
cardinal seemed underwhelmed by Murnaghan’s opinion that clause 
three would leave the law as it stood, and there is an unmistakable 
note of resignation in his comment that ‘that is the most we could 
hope for’.62 Innately pessimistic, Logue was particularly fearful 
for the denominational status of teacher-training colleges in the 
light of Augustine Birrell’s amendment that every school receiving 
public money should be open to all.63 It was O’Donnell rather than 
Logue who communicated with Redmond; Kelly was in Rome at 
58 Government of Ireland. A bill [as amended in committee and on report] to 
amend the provision for the government of Ireland (2 & 3 Geo. 5 c. 3).
59 Ibid., c. 42.
60 See the paper by Conor Mulvagh in this book; Miller, Church, State and Nation, 
p. 289.
61 Logue to O’Donnell, 5 November 1912 cited in Privilege, Michael Logue, p. 93.
62 Logue to Walsh, 3 December 1912, Walsh papers, 383/5, DDA.
63 James Murnaghan to Walsh, 14 November 1912, Walsh papers, 377/1, DDA; 
Logue to Walsh, 12 December 1912, Walsh papers, 383/5, DDA.
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this time. When Murnaghan’s opinions belatedly reached Redmond 
in December 1912 he believed that it was too late for alterations. 
Moreover, the Irish Party leader maintained that ‘some of the suggested 
amendments are of a character which would instantly arouse all the 
latent anti-Catholic feeling in England, and would create a storm 
around our heads which would in all probability wreck the Home 
Rule Bill’.64 He did, however, offer reassurance about training colleges. 
If anything, Redmond’s dismissive response demonstrates clearly the 
limits of episcopal authority and input. Logue was resigned to accept 
the bill, commenting bleakly: ‘We were promised a generous measure 
of Home Rule. Now that the bill is through Committee it looks to 
me like a skeleton on which to hang restrictions.’65
The spectre of partition
By the beginning of 1913 these concerns appeared almost trivial as 
the Home Rule saga entered a new and ominous phase. In the House 
of Commons, on 1 January, Edward Carson, the effective leader of 
the Ulster unionists, unveiled a modified strategy with a resolution, 
which was defeated, to exclude the entire province of Ulster. For 
Redmond partition remained unthinkable, though he was willing 
to contemplate Home Rule within Home Rule, which in turn was 
anathema to the Ulster bishops. As tension rose in Ireland with the 
formation of unionist and nationalist paramilitary forces, the Irish 
Party was compelled to accept some form of separate treatment for 
Ulster. Rumours of compromise were deeply unsettling for northern 
nationalists. In a letter to Redmond on 9 October 1913 Bishop 
O’Donnell stressed the ‘growing apprehension on the part of a good 
many Catholics and Nationalists in the North of Ireland in reference 
64 Redmond to O’Donnell, 12 December 1912, Redmond papers, MS 15217/3, 
NLI.
65 Logue to Walsh, 12 December 1912, Walsh papers, 383/5, DDA.
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to conference schemes’.66 While he assured the nationalist leader that 
they would go to great lengths to meet unionist concerns, ‘nothing 
could justify cutting this [nationalist] minority off from their claims 
under the Bill, and deliberately leaving them under a harrow that 
might be worse than what they have endured’.67 Revealingly, he also 
emphasised fears of the detrimental impact that exclusion of the 
north-east would have on Catholic education.
In his Lenten pastoral in February 1914, Logue presciently fore-
cast that ‘this year is fraught with vital issues for the destinies of 
our dear country’.68 As various exclusion schemes were mooted by 
the cabinet and unionist opposition mounted, the Ulster bishops 
grew increasingly apprehensive. It was inevitable that it should be 
so. Four dioceses – Armagh, Derry, Clogher and Kilmore – strad-
dled the mooted six-county border, while two others – Dromore 
and Down & Connor – were situated entirely within the north-east 
corner. In February Bishop McHugh made clear his concern that the 
fate of northern Catholics was being marginalised at Westminster. 
As Phoenix has argued, the prelate’s misgivings were a reflection of 
grass-roots feeling in Counties Tyrone, Fermanagh and Derry, and 
they could not be blithely dismissed.69 Despite assurances from Joe 
Devlin that ‘nothing will be done that will not have the sanction 
and support of all our friends in Ulster’, the bishop, in consultation 
with O’Donnell, proposed a nationalist meeting in Derry.70 As he 
explained to Redmond:
The Orange faction is never done crying out intolerance and publishing 
what they would suffer under H[ome] Rule, but there is not a word 
66 O’Donnell to Redmond, 9 October 1913, Redmond papers, MS 15217/4, NLI.
67 Ibid.
68 Irish Independent, 23 February 1914.
69 Phoenix, Northern Nationalism, p. 11.
70 Devlin to McHugh, 19 February 1914 cited in Harris, Catholic Church, p. 48.
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about what Catholics and Nationalists in Ulster would suffer if the 
Orangemen got control… The great object of the meeting was to give 
the Liberal Party to understand that the Nationalists of the North have 
their rights as well as the Orangemen … to see that there were two sides 
to the Ulster Question.71
The Irish Party leader appealed for the meeting to be called off and 
McHugh consented with great reluctance. Derry was the cause of 
further alarm in March when Redmond again prevailed on the bishop 
to cancel a proposed route march by Irish Volunteers, believing it 
‘a fatal mistake, also the best means of playing into [the] hands of 
Carson as almost certain to lead [to] terrible consequences and 
render our position here much more difficult’.72 McHugh succeeded, 
but only after threatening to have the march denounced from the 
altar.73 The political situation was beginning to spiral out of episcopal 
or party control.
Much depended, of course, on how exclusion was defined. Around 
mid-February O’Donnell appears to have met the IPP leadership in 
London. In the event of exclusion proving unavoidable, the prelate 
recommended the scheme proposed by Horace Plunkett: that Ulster 
should have the right to vote itself out after a period of not less than 
ten years.74 David Lloyd George’s county option favoured initial ex-
clusion for any individual Ulster county for three years before coming 
under Home Rule. O’Donnell recognised the risks this posed: ‘The 
perils to the party in the L.[loyd] G.[eorge] scheme are formidable. 
Even if we supposed the country willing in all the circumstances to 
accept or tolerate it, the party would not be safe without wide con-
71 McHugh to Redmond, 28 February 1914, Redmond papers, MS 15203/5, NLI.
72 Telegram Redmond to McHugh, 20 March 1914, Redmond papers, MS 
15203/5, NLI.
73 McHugh to Redmond, 21 March 1914, Redmond papers, MS 15203/5, NLI. 
74 The Irish Times, Irish Independent, 11 February 1914; Miller, Church, State and 
Nation, p. 297.
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sultation amounting to a mandate.’75 Redmond was forced to accept 
the scheme in early March, ostensibly as ‘the price of peace’.76 But 
winning acceptance for this formula was no easy task. He dispatched 
emissaries to elicit the support of prominent northern national-
ists, including the Ulster bishops. Devlin met McHugh, O’Donnell 
and Tohill, the terminally ill bishop of Down and Connor,77 with 
‘eminently satisfactory’ results.78 Given Logue’s antipathy towards 
the AOH, Jeremiah MacVeagh and James Lardner, MP for North 
Monaghan, visited Ara Coeli, the cardinal’s residence in Armagh. 
MacVeagh reported to Redmond that the cardinal recognised that 
the bill had to be saved: ‘Of course he doesn’t love the concessions but 
will not object.’79 The bishops were prepared to rally behind the party 
as long as a unionist administration with possible control of educa-
tion was not established in Belfast. Despite their endorsement, the 
bishops’ private views were another matter. Logue confided to Walsh: 
‘I fear the concessions on the Home Rule Bill will be a bad business 
for us here in this part of the North. It will leave us more than ever 
under the heel of the Orangemen. Worst of all it will leave them free 
to tamper with our education.’80 Bishop McKenna of Clogher hoped 
that southern unionists would not accept exclusion. He admitted to 
Michael O’Riordan, rector of the Irish College in Rome, his fear that 
if temporary exclusion was granted and worked reasonably well then 
it would almost certainly become permanent.81 Asquith’s doubling of 
the moratorium to six years merely intensified this anxiety.
Holding out for a clean break of six counties, Carson rejected the 
75 O’Donnell to Redmond, 25 February 1914, Redmond papers, MS 15217/4, 
NLI.
76 D. Gwynn, The Life of John Redmond (London, 1932), p. 268.
77 He died on 4 July 1914 and was succeeded by Joseph MacRory in August 1915.
78 Gwynn, Life of John Redmond, p. 269.
79 MacVeagh to Redmond, n.d. [6 March 1914], Redmond papers, MS 15205/4, 
NLI.
80 Logue to Walsh, 13 March 1914, Walsh papers, 384/4, DDA.
81 Hepburn, Catholic Belfast, p. 152.
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county option as it could guarantee him only four. As the political 
situation deteriorated rapidly with the Curragh incident, the UVF 
gun-running and increased enrolment in the Irish Volunteers, the 
threat of civil war grew progressively more real. This is captured by 
O’Donnell in a letter to Redmond in early May:
A marked change for the worse has gradually come over the attitude and 
spirit of Ulster Unionists … there is a bad 12th of July spirit even where 
it was not known for long years. I should not be surprised if it were worse 
in the included counties than in the N.E. In the N.W. the Unionists are 
constantly saying they will fight.82
Ultimately the impasse over the geographical area to be excluded 
proved intractable, and the outbreak of the First World War, merely 
postponed a resolution of the Ulster conundrum. In the spring 
and early summer the Ulster bishops were placed in an invidious 
position. They had deferred to Redmond’s wishes while at the same 
time attempting to moderate the anxiety of the faithful. In Derry, 
for example, McHugh called for no public rejoicing when the Home 
Rule bill passed its third reading in May lest it be construed as 
provocation and spark disturbances.83 Yet among the Ulster bishops 
a lurking fear intensified that they might be sacrificed in the interests 
of political expediency.
The death of Pope Pius X on 20 August 1914 and the election of 
his successor, Pope Benedict XV, preoccupied the hierarchy during 
the early weeks of the war. Logue spent six weeks in Rome at this 
time and had considerable difficulty negotiating a passage home, re-
turning on 29 September.84 Redmond’s achievement in placing the 
82 O’Donnell to Redmond, 9 May 1914, Redmond papers, MS 15217/4, NLI.
83 The Derry Journal, 25 May 1914.
84 Logue to Walsh, 12 September 1914, Walsh papers, 384/4, DDA; ICD, 1915, 
p. 538.
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Home Rule bill on the statute book on 18 September was under-
mined by its immediate suspension and Asquith’s assurance that spe-
cial provision would be made for Protestant Ulster. Messages of con-
gratulation were forthcoming from the archbishop of Cashel and the 
bishops of Kerry, Elphin, Clonfert, Kildare and Leighlin, Raphoe and 
Portsmouth.85 More telling is the number of prelates who did not 
write. No statement regarding Home Rule was made at the meet-
ing of the Irish episcopal conference on 13 October 1914, but two 
resolutions touched on the war. The first declared that the supply of 
chaplains for Irish soldiers at the Front was inadequate. The second 
directed the clergy to remind the faithful of the sufferings of Catholic 
Belgium and to encourage them to subscribe to the Belgian relief 
find.86 A total of £27,000, or an average of £1,000 for every diocese, 
was raised by December 1914. Bishop Browne of Cloyne pressed for 
the contributions to be published in the press because of the belief 
that ‘those who are opposed to us in religion or political sentiment 
parade what they have done, which is not much, and show a disposi-
tion to belittle, or suppress the publication of the generous contribu-
tion of our poor people’.87
Conclusion
The third Home Rule crisis demonstrated the limitations of the 
Catholic Church’s political influence. The bishops were important 
figures, but they proved largely unable to shape the political 
process. The sense of hopefulness evident in 1912 quickly gave way 
to resignation and then to the dread among the northern bishops 
that their interests, especially in education, would suffer in any 
compromise with unionism. During the tribulations of 1914 the 
85 ICD, 1915, p. 537.
86 Ibid., pp 540–1; Bishop Robert Browne to Walsh, 29 October 1914, Walsh 
papers, 384/4, DDA.
87 Browne to Walsh, 31 December 1914, Walsh papers, 384/4, DDA.
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Ulster bishops moved from being disenchanted with Redmond’s 
faltering policy to losing all faith in him. This was compounded by the 
formation of a coalition government in May 1915. Bishop Fogarty of 
Killaloe, hitherto a strong party supporter, deemed the ‘coalition with 
Carson on top…  a horrible scandal and intolerable slight on Irish 
sentiment’. In the same letter he pronounced Home Rule ‘dead and 
buried’ and suggested that Ireland was ‘without a Nationalist Party’.88 
For his northern colleagues the coup de grâce was Lloyd George’s ill-
fated partition scheme in the summer of 1916. All bar O’Donnell 
publicly disavowed the proposals. Bishop Joseph MacRory of Down 
and Connor, McKenna and McHugh sent messages of support to 
an anti-exclusion meeting in Omagh, one of several in the north-
west, on 7 June. For McKenna, partition was simply ‘unthinkable’ and 
‘repugnant to every patriotic Irishman no matter what his political 
views’.89 The Irish Party leadership pinned its hopes on gaining 
acceptance for the proposals at a representative nationalist convention 
in St Mary’s hall, Belfast, on 23 June. Redmond sought Logue’s views 
on the composition of the convention and requested a meeting with 
the Ulster bishops. Fearing ‘a project to cut off Ulster except Cavan, 
Monaghan and Donegal’, Logue arranged a meeting on 16 June in 
Dublin, where it would attract less attention.90 The bishops insisted 
that a plebiscite be held in each excluded county at the end of the 
war, a proposal to which Redmond would not agree. The extent of the 
breach between the Ulster prelates and the party was captured in a 
frank letter from Bishop McHugh, writing from Dublin on 19 June, 
to Alderman James McCarron, which was published in The Derry 
Journal:
88 Fogarty to Redmond, 3 June 1915, Redmond papers, MS 15188/5, NLI.
89 The Derry Journal, 9 June 1916.
90 Logue to Bishop of Down and Connor, 7 June 1916, Logue papers, Arch/9/3/1/1, 
OFMLA; Logue to Redmond, 11 June 1916, Redmond papers, MS 15201/9, NLI.
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As Irishmen, the bishops cannot but regard with feelings of deep regret 
the admission of the principle of a divided Ireland … But what causes 
more alarm to the bishops than the voluntary surrender of the National 
ideal is the perilous position in which religion and Catholic education 
would be placed were those proposals, so imperfectly understood by the 
public, reduced to practice. If the provision is only temporary… why is a 
New Executive to be established in Belfast with all the machinery of an 
independent body… It is said that these are not the proposals of the Irish 
Party. I grant they are not. But I say to stand up in defence of them, to 
suggest the acceptance of them, is just as bad as to be branded with the 
dishonourable reputation of having fathered them.91
Despite episcopal repudiation of the Lloyd George proposals, Devlin’s 
supporters ensured that they were approved at the Belfast convention. 
This pyrrhic victory inflicted irreparable damage on the Irish Party. 
The nightmare scenario of a local Ulster settlement led Logue to 
declare famously that it would be ‘infinitely better to remain as we 
are for fifty years to come, under English rule, than to accept these 
proposals’.92 His was a new spin on the well-worn three-word creed: 
Ulster says no.
91 The Derry Journal, 21 June 1916. On this episode see Phoenix, Northern 
Nationalism, pp. 28–33.
92 ICD, 1917, p. 517; The Derry Journal, 21 June 1916.
